This paper seeks to investigate how stakeholder power and an organization's pursuit of legitimacy influence its reaction to conflict with a supplier. We conduct an empirical study among travel agents and tour operators to test the relationship between conflict and stakeholder power and legitimacy derived from three different stakeholders. Our findings imply that power has a dual role. Whereas supplier power reduces buyer-supplier conflict, stakeholder power increases it. Moreover, this study shows that the quest to achieve greater legitimacy from the firm's competitive arena increases conflict. This paper is one of the few that test stakeholder theory empirically. We demonstrate that stakeholder theory provides additional explanations above the hitherto taken dyadic approach towards understanding conflict. This paper also shows that power can simultaneously reduce and increase conflict depending on which party possesses power. Greater supplier power decreases conflict while greater stakeholder power and stakeholder derived legitimacy increases it. Therefore, organizations have to balance their stakeholder and supplier interests.
setting, we show that power can simultaneously positively and negatively influence conflict depending on which party holds power. Furthermore, we show that legitimacy sought from stakeholders provides a reason why conflict may be rational as organizations strive not only for economic but also social fitness (Grewal and Dharwadkar, 2002 ). An additional contribution of the present research is that we investigate whether stakeholder theory can be usefully applied empirically to relatively common organizational issues, such as a firm's reaction to conflict, rather than specific issues, such as boycotts, that have characterized much of the previous stakeholder research.
Next, we present our conceptual arguments on how conflict can be explained. We then discuss the empirical study, set in the context of the travel industry. We conclude with results and their implications.
Hypotheses

The dyadic perspective: the influence of supplier power on supplier-buyer conflict
The marketing literature on channel conflict has been dominated by studies taking dyadic perspectives and overwhelmingly this research suggests that power is a major antecedent of channel conflict in buyer-supplier relationships (Gaski 1984) . Although we recognize that there has been some discussion on the direction of the power-conflict relationship (Etgar 1978) , there are strong arguments to expect greater relative supplier power to reduce a buyer's response to conflict. First, organizations that are more powerful usually possess vital resources. This makes it difficult for the exchange partner to retaliate to any conflict started as it may threaten the availability of the very resource on which it is dependent. Second, an increased noncoercive power of one party over another increases incentives for cooperation and normalization of the exchange relationship, which in turn tempers manifest conflict (Gundlach and Cadotte, 1994) . Moreover, research in psychology has also shown that if there is a greater relative power of one party over another, conflict is reduced (Lawler et al., 1988) .
Hence,
H1:
Relative supplier power decreases the severity of the buyer's reaction to conflict with that supplier.
The extra-dyadic perspective: the influence of stakeholder power and legitimacy on supplierbuyer conflict
Effects from outside of the dyadic, buyer-seller, relationship may influence conflict. We propose that, even controlling for the effect of relative supplier power, having more powerful stakeholders increases conflict. Stakeholders are defined as any group or individual who can influence, or is influenced by, the achievement of the organization's objectives (Freeman, 1984) . As this definition is very broad, subsequent scholars have narrowed the definition of stakeholders down to those individuals or groups who possess power, legitimacy, or urgency relative to an organization. It is also this "narrow view" that we adopt in this paper.
Stakeholder theory was introduced by Freeman (1984) to study the conflict organizations face in satisfying the needs of shareholders that wanted high returns, while simultaneously using strategies to reach that end that were deemed acceptable by various individuals, organizations, and groups (Harrison and Freeman, 1999) . Thus stakeholder theory is about conflicts between self-interest and "other regarding" interest (Agle et al., 1999) . One of the key issues this theory focuses on is if, and how, stakeholders influence organizational outcomes (Berman et al., 1999, Harrison and Freeman, 1999) . Stakeholder theory suggests that the means stakeholders have to influence organizational outcomes are based on power and legitimacy because without having at least some legitimacy or power, a stakeholder cannot influence a focal organization (Mitchell et al., 1997) . Based upon previous research (Maignan and McAlister, 2003) and interviews with five managers in the travel industry, competitors, customers, and the industry association were identified as important stakeholders. That is, based on the interviews, competitors, customers, and the industry association appeared to have power and/or legitimacy relative to most travel agents and tour operators). Consequently, we take power and legitimacy for each of the three identified stakeholders into account. In figure 1 we show each of these stakeholders and also show how we expect these stakeholders to impact conflict. Power in a dyadic setting is the relative strength of organization A over B. In a network setting, stakeholders can influence a focal organization if they possess some degree of power Ferrell, 2004, Oliver, 1991 and a target market, and stakeholders can influence organizations by withholding or threatening to withhold such resources. Because of this power, stakeholders can pressure an organization to do something its exchange partner may not necessarily want, thereby causing conflict with that partner (i.e. supplier). As powerful stakeholders are more salient to managers they are more likely to act upon pressure initiated by powerful stakeholders in order to satisfy their demand (Agle et al., 1999) . Moreover, based on conflict spiral theory, one would expect that greater power of stakeholders result in increasing conflict between buyers and sellers. Conflict spiral theory suggests that retaliation is a central aspect of conflict where actions of one party (i.e. stakeholders) cause another party to retaliate. More precisely, the likelihood that stakeholders will introduce conflict issues, and the expectancy of an organization that this stakeholder will do so, increase if the stakeholder has more relative power over the organization (Lawler et al., 1988) . The argument to this is that if stakeholders have more power, they are more tempted to use it because they expect a low likelihood of retaliation by the other party. However, once they use this power the organization may be tempted to retaliate to other parties. This greater use of their power can cause greater conflicts between the buyer and seller as stakeholder demands (e.g. adhering to industry regulations) can be conflicting to the functioning of the buyer-seller relationship (Kumar et al., 1998 ). An example where conflict between a buyer and seller was increased due to a powerful stakeholder is the case of StarKist where Frooman (1999) described how StarKist was pressured by an environmental group to change the way how suppliers of StarKist caught fish. In turn, StarKist pressured its suppliers, to change their fishing methods.
The environmental group used their power in this case (by means of asking for consumer boycotts) to pressure StarKist to engage in conflict with its suppliers even though, as Frooman (1999) , described these suppliers were very powerful.
Overall, we expect that more powerful stakeholders can increase channel conflict:
H2a: Power of an industry association increases the severity of a buyer's reaction to conflict.
H2b: Power of competitors increases the severity of a buyer's reaction to conflict.
H2c: Power of customers increases the severity of a buyer's reaction to conflict.
In networks, organizations strive to enhance their perceived attractiveness (Anderson et al., 1994) . This perceived attractiveness is the extent to which a firm believes that engaging in an exchange relation with a partner firm has, in addition to the effect on outcomes within the relation, an advantageous effect on the attractiveness of an organization as an exchange partner. As firms strive to enhance their attractiveness as an exchange partner so do they strive to obtain legitimacy. Legitimacy is defined as a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, or definitions (Suchman, 1995) . Seeking legitimacy is important as it helps organizations in 3 ways. Firstly, legitimacy, through the acceptance of an organization by its environment, facilitates operating in that environment.
Secondly, seeking legitimacy also increases stability of the organization (Suchman, 1995, DiMaggio and Powell, 1983) , which is something most organizations value. This stability of organizations is derived from the increase in trustworthiness, understanding, and credibility (Suchman, 1995) accruing from actions that are deemed to be legitimate. Thirdly, if a reaction to conflict is perceived to be a legitimate action, this will have an anticipated constructive effect on the attractiveness of an organization because the consequence is the acceptance of an organization by its environment (Deephouse, 1996) . Seeking legitimacy may thus increase the severity of response to conflict. An example of how stakeholders can increase conflict is Virgin's reaction to the prices offered by music companies.
3
The conflict
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Virgin felt it got a worse deal than its competitors did. Virgin's reaction to this conflict was to withhold payments to these music companies with the argument being that key stakeholders to Virgin, its competitors, got a better pricing deal. Thereby Virgin sought legitimacy for their claim of unfair pricing by referring to what its competitors get. If engaging in conflict, such as in the Virgin example, enhances legitimacy, it may provide a reason as to why conflict is beneficial and in the self-interest of organizations. The functionality of channel conflict has been acknowledged by many scholars (Brown and Day, 1981) , but little attention is given as to what this functionality is. We suggest that an organization's quest for legitimacy may provide just such a reason as to why reacting to conflict may be functional.
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
H3a: Seeking legitimacy from an industry association increases the severity of a buyer's reaction to conflict.
H3b: Seeking legitimacy from competitors increases the severity of a buyer's reaction to conflict.
H3c: Seeking legitimacy from customers increases the severity of a buyer's reaction to conflict.
Research Method
We study the influence of stakeholders on the severity of reactions to conflict in the context of travel agents and tour operators in the Netherlands (SIC codes 4724 and 4725) which is also our sampling frame. This context is appropriate to study conflict because as it recently experienced a number of conflict issues, which facilitates respondents' recall. Moreover, the context of travel agents and tour operators is one where substantial variation exist in the size of its suppliers, thereby suggesting variation in the power these suppliers can exercise over these travel agents and tour operators. Moreover, substantial variation exists in the size of these agents and tour operators and their customers (ranging from individual travelers buying a single ticket to large corporate accounts), as well as that multiple industry associations exists. All, this suggests variation in the power these possible stakeholders have.
As an initial step in the data collection process, we conducted interviews among travel agencies and their suppliers. This provided a general insight into the conflict issues present in the industry, as well as into their causes and consequences from both perspectives. The interviews revealed that both the buyer and supplier had a very similar perception of the issues over which they have conflict. These issues are similar to those found in previous research such as a lack of product or service availability, increases in prices charged, efforts of the supplier to sell products directly (i.e. the threat of disintermediation), and customer complaints that were passed on to the supplier.
Data Collection Procedure
The data were gathered using mail surveys based on the process lined out by Dillman (2000) .
Using the Dutch chamber of commerce database, we selected all organizations that were economically active from SIC codes 4724 and 4725. Subsequently we called these organizations to 1) verify details, 2) ask for cooperation, and 3) ask for the name of an informant which, on the basis of a small number of prior interviews we identified as the CEO or director for smaller companies and the marketing or sales manager for larger companies.
We approached these informants at the national level, and consequently had no more than one response per organization (defined at the legal level). We sent the questionnaires to 458
informants and a net response of 116 surveys, or 25%, was obtained. As channel conflict is generally considered a sensitive subject, this response rate is satisfactory and compares favorably to the response obtained from most other channel studies.
Tests between early and late respondents revealed no differences between the characteristics of the organizations that were surveyed including organizational size and informant tenure and competence. Thus on the basis of the ideas of Armstrong and Overton (1977) nonresponse bias does not appear to be a problem. A stronger test was carried out to see if the population drawn from SIC codes 4724 and 4725 of the chamber of commerce database differs significantly from the sample obtained by comparing organizational size. We compared the average size of firms included in the chamber of commerce database to our sample obtained but found no difference, thus concluding that our sample appears representative of the population. In Table 1 we show organizational size statistics for our sample and the population.
The informants we surveyed were on average over 10 years in their current function, which is an indicator of their competency on the subject (Kumar et al., 1993) . Consistent with this, the informants considered themselves to be knowledgeable about the relationships with the major suppliers of the organization (average=5.7/7-point Likert scale where 7 is the highest score).
No responses from informants were deleted based on their reported competency.
Measurement
Multi-item measures are available for all the constructs necessary to test the hypotheses. An overview of all measures, together with the Cronbach alpha of the scale can be found in Appendix 1. In Table 1 we show a correlation matrix of all the constructs, together with their means and standard deviations and a number of sample and population statistics.
Severity of conflict reaction is the severity of the response of the buyer over a conflict issue
and is based on the scale of Antia and Frazier (2001) . This scale assesses how firm, uncompromising, tough, and decisive the reaction to a conflict issue was. On average informants indicated, on a scale ranging from 4-28, a severity of 19.77. Notice that this scale measures the severity of response and not if this response was positive or negative.
Power is based on the 2-item scale proposed by Ganesan which measures the supplier's or stakeholder's relative power over the buyer (1993) . This scale is extended with one new item on the relative power of a supplier or stakeholder over the buyer. Care was taken that this additional item is consistent with Ganesan's power definition.
Legitimacy has been operationalized in two slightly different ways in the previous literature.
Agle , Mitchell, and Sonnenfield (1999) operationalize the construct of legitimacy in the light of appropriateness and properness while Grewal, Comer, and Mehta (2001) operationalize legitimacy in terms of how actions would portray the organization towards other organizations. Consistent with our focus on explaining behavior we adopted Grewal, Comer, and Mehta's scale. We define legitimacy as a generalized perception that the actions of an organization are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995) . Consistent with Grewal, Comer, and Mehta's scale the first two items measure the extent to which organizations mimic other organizations while the third item measures legitimacy as a motive.
We control for conflict attribution as in a network context the blame for conflict determines how it is evaluated and reacted to (Frazier, 1983) . These attributions are most commonly classified in terms of self, partner, or external attribution Stern, 1992, Hibbard et al., 2001 ). As issues introduced by the buyer will not lead to reactions by this buyer, we focus on partner and external attribution. Both variables are measured using the 3-item scales of Hibbard, Kumar, and Stern (2001) . These scales reflect who is responsible for the conflict from the perspective of the buyer.
We calculated Cronbach's Alpha coefficient to assess consistency and found coefficients that were satisfactory (ranging from .70 to .91). An assessment of unidimensionality using principal component analysis resulted in one-dimensional scales, which supports that we measure one underlying dimension per construct. We conducted a confirmatory factor analysis to assess fit of the indicators with the constructs. The resulting model (χ 2 =579.10, DF=319, RMSEA=0.076, CFI=0.89) fits reasonably well.
Using the procedure of Fornell and Larcker (1981) we tested for discriminant validity of our measures by comparing the variance extracted from each pair of constructs to the squared correlation of the two constructs. Because in every case the variance extracted exceeded the squared correlation of the constructs, our results indicate that our measures display discriminant validity. The average variances extracted range from .50 to .87 (see diagonal of Table 1 ) and are acceptable.
Results
We tested the hypotheses described previously using ordinary least squares. The results are shown in Table 2 .
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The findings suggest that increased power of the seller is associated with a weaker reaction to conflict, confirming extant research and supporting Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 2 states that we expect stakeholder power to increase reactions to channel conflict. We find support that customer power (H2c) indeed increases channel conflict. Hypothesis 3 states that seeking stakeholder legitimacy increases channel conflict. We find support that seeking competitor legitimacy (H3b) indeed increases channel conflict. The effect sizes of customer power and competitor legitimacy on the severity of conflict reaction (0.22 and 0.26 respectively) indicate relatively strong effects. Our findings suggest that one potential stakeholder, the industry association, has no influence but that the two other stakeholders, customers and competitors, do influence conflict, even if we control for the origin of the conflict. We find no empirical support to suggest that both legitimacy and power of one stakeholder simultaneously influence the focal organization to react to channel conflict.
A number of tests were carried out to analyze all interactions between the different attributions, power, and the stakeholder attributes but no patterns could be found.
Discussion
This research conforms to the calls of several channel studies to expand beyond the dyadic perspective that characterizes most existing marketing channel research. We show that stakeholder theory can be usefully applied to marketing channel research and that using a stakeholder approach provides additional insights over a dyadic approach. Specifically we find that the role of power differs for dyadic and extra-dyadic approaches. In a dyadic approach, more power of the partner is associated with a less severe reaction to conflict and in an extra-dyadic approach more power of a stakeholder is associated with a stronger response to conflict. The reason why we find that supplier power decreases conflict, while stakeholder power increases it may lie in the fact that it is generally easier to retaliate towards suppliers than it is towards stakeholders (Lawler et al., 1988) . Moreover, the argument of conflict spiral theory is stronger if parties are more committed to use whatever power they have to reach their goals. Stakeholders may be more likely to use their power than suppliers because by their very nature suppliers are partially dependent on the business they do with their buyers whereas stakeholder may depend less on the organizations they are trying to influence.
In addition, stakeholder theory allows us to identify the importance of legitimacy in explaining channel conflict. We find some support for the notion that seeking legitimacy is a motive for firms to react to channel conflict. As such, stakeholder theory provides an important mechanism to explain why conflict may be rational. According to Anderson, Håkansson, and Johanson (1994) , firms aim to increase their attractiveness as an exchange partner. The constructive effects of seeking legitimacy, including an increased likelihood of organizational survival, acceptance of its environment, and an increased stability of the organization, may make an organization more attractive as an exchange partner. As we find power and legitimacy to influence conflict, we find support for Grewal and Dharwadkar's (2002) proposition that power and legitimacy of the network surrounding the organization influence intra-dyadic processes. Moreover, these findings also show that stakeholder theory can be usefully applied empirically for investigating conflict.
We found no effect of power or legitimacy with respect to the industry association. One possible explanation for this may be that the importance organizations attach to the industry association is much less than either that of their competitors or customers, which both are stakeholders that more directly influence the bottom line. This finding is in line with a 'narrow view' on stakeholders where only those organizations of direct economic relevance are deemed stakeholders (Mitchell et al., 1997) . Consistent with the notion of market orientation that customers and competitors are at the core of a firm's orientation towards its environment (Narver and Slater, 1990) , managers react to conflict more severely in the event that their customers are more powerful or that the firm can derive legitimacy from its competitors by doing so.
Managerial Implications
Channel conflict is a pervasive issue in many buyer-seller relationships. Although conflict usually has a negative connotation, our findings suggest that there is a positive side to conflict as conflict can enhance a firm's legitimacy. That is, conflict may increase the acceptance to certain stakeholders of an organization. We find that particularly the acceptance of an organization by its competitors is enhanced if a firm reacts more strongly to conflict. This finding points out that regardless of the positive or negative effects of conflict in the buyerseller relationship itself, conflict may have beneficial effects (increase legitimacy, the acceptance of an organization) outside of it.
We also find that conflict in the same buyer-seller relationship may increase due to powerful stakeholders that the organization faces. The conflicting demands that these stakeholders may place on how these buyer-seller relationships operate may cause that conflict issues are reacted to more severely than would happen if these stakeholders were not present. This implies that firms should be aware that partners facing relatively powerful stakeholders may be difficult to deal with due to the presence of powerful stakeholders. Our findings suggest especially a firm's customers are powerful stakeholders in the context of tour operators and travel agents.
Limitations and Issues for Further Research
As with nearly every other piece of research several limitations apply. A first limitation relates to the scope of the study. Our research identifies only the role that stakeholders have on conflict in a buyer-seller relationship. Conflict can also take place with organizations other than the supplier. For reasons of parsimony, we have not included such cases in our analysis but the basic model could be easily adjusted to accommodate this. Our focus on a single country bars us from identifying a possible role of the government as a stakeholder and country characteristics could give rise to idiosyncrasies that cannot be assessed using the current data. Also other stakeholders such as environmental groups or communities (See Maignan et al., 2005 for an overview of various stakeholder groups) could influence channel conflict.
As we conducted our study in a single country and a single industry, generalization of this study could be an issue. For example in certain industries customers may have very little power. By collecting data in other industries the generalizability of the findings could be tested.
Finally our study uses a single informant. Because the dependent variable of our study is manifest, and therefore more factual, the single source issue may be less of an issue (Summers, 2001 Power customers The customers are more powerful than us.
.84 In our relationship with our customers they have more power The customers can force decisions upon us. Power competitors The competitors are more powerful than us.
.86 In our relationship with our competitors they have more power. The competitors can force decisions upon us.
Power industry
The industry association is more powerful than us.
.79 In our relationship with the industry association they have more power. The industry association can force decisions upon us. Legitimacy customers It would provide legitimacy to us with respect to our customers.
.91
The best companies behave like this towards our customers. It would portray us towards customers as an organization that reacts strongly to conflicts. Legitimacy competitors It would provide legitimacy to us with respect to our competitors.
.88
The best competitors behave like this. It would portray us towards our competitors as an organization that reacts strongly to conflicts. Legitimacy industry It would provide legitimacy to us with respect to the industry association.
.87
The best companies within the industry association behave like this. It would portray us towards the industry association as an organization that reacts strongly to conflicts. Partner attribution The supplier undertook the action because they tend look out for their own interests, not ours.
The supplier is self-centered, and this accounts for their action that led to conflict. The supplier's act that led to conflict was intended to benefit them, not ours.
External attribution
Competitive conditions forced the supplier to take the action that led to conflict.
.79
The behavior of our supplier leading to the conflict was understandable given the market conditions in our area. The current environment was responsible for actions of the supplier leading to conflict.
Note: all items were measured using a seven-point Likert scales ranging from completely disagree to completely agree. a : Newly added item. * P < .10; ** P < .05; *** P < .01, T-tests are two-sided Endnotes:
